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CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE
BARRIERS SAME-SEX COUPLES FACE IN
THEIR QUEST TO BECOME A FAMILY UNIT
The right to marry and raise a family are among the most
significant rights accorded to American citizens. 1 Marriage is a
fundamental right 2 and, as such, is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 3 Courts envision
the right to marry as a union between a man and a woman, thus
placing a continuing limitation on the recognition of same-sex
marriages. 4 Furthermore, state statutory schemes have pro-
tected the morals and values of the traditional family consisting
of a husband, a wife, and children. 5
A significant consequence of failing to recognize same-sex
marriage is the denial of benefits reserved for legally married
1 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that basic civil right to
marriage cannot be denied based on racial classification); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that these rights are inherent in concept of
liberty); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that right to procreation
is protected against state's unwarranted interference by sterilization); see also Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (establishing liberty interest for families in
raising children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating "right to marry,"
establish home and raise children are essential to happiness of people).
2 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (indicating right to marry is part
of fundamental right of privacy implicit in Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
3 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that right to bear chil-
dren free from government interference is fundamental and may not be burdened by
classification based on marital status); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (announcing right to mar-
riage cannot be denied based on race); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (proclaiming that state's
sterilization law is subject to strict scrutiny because it affects basic liberty).
4 See Julienne C. Scocca, Society's Ban on Same-Sex Marriages: A Reevaluation of the
So-Called "Fundamental Right" of Marriage, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 719, 720 (1992)
(stating that "...to date, no jurisdiction in this country has recognized same-sex mar-
riage").
5 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989) (holding unmarried biological
father has no fundamental right to relationship with his illegitimate child); Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (finding state statute restricting wrongful death suits
to parents who have legitimated child is rationally related to state's interest in promot-
ing traditional family unit). But see Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375-76 (holding that statute
denying marriage to any man under obligation to support by any court order or judgment
unconstitutional).
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couples. 6 In addition, although inroads have been made which
allow same-sex couples to adopt and raise children, 7 there is still
reluctance to treat these couples the same as heterosexual cou-
ples. 8 Since society's goal is to promote stable family units, ho-
mosexuals should be permitted to marry and be afforded the
same protections heterosexual couples enjoy.9
This Note focuses on homosexual couples' right to marry and
their fight for equal rights and recognition as family units. Part
One focuses on the evolving definition of marriage and the im-
pact of the Baehr v. Lewin10 decision on this issue. Part Two
discusses the legislative ramifications that have arisen from
same-sex couples' struggle to acquire the right to marry. Part
Three analyzes the denial of this right under both the Due Proc-
ess Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part Four traces the development of the right to
raise a family with respect to traditional and non-traditional
family structures and argues that a viable approach to establish-
ing equal rights for families with same-sex parents is to utilize
adoption law. Finally, this Note concludes that the right to
6 See Jennifer L. Heeb, Homosexual Marriage, The Changing American Family, and
the Heterosexual Right to Privacy, 24 SETON HALL. L. REV. 347, 391 (1993) (concluding
denial of right to marry denies same-sex couples legal, emotional and economic benefits
granted to married heterosexual couples); Felicia E. Lucious, Note, Adoption of Tammy:
Should Homosexuals Adopt Children?, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 171, 180-81 (1994)
(articulating that denial of right to marry deprives same-sex couples all benefits and le-
gitimacy which flow from this legal status).
7 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 47, 61 (1995) (stating that "gay people's children come through prior relation-
ships, artificial insemination, surrogacy and adoption"); Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic
Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek Norms and Modern Sexual Con-
troversies, 80 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1650 (1994) (noting many same-sex couples turn to arti-
ficial insemination to obtain children).
8 See Lisa R. Zimmer, Family, Marriage, and The Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 681, 693 (1990) (stating that while same-sex couples share family characteristics
similar to that found in traditional families, these families are not provided adequate le-
gal protections).
9 See D. Marianne Brower Blair, Getting the Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth:
The Limits of Liability for Wrongful Adoption, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 851, 945 (1992)
(noting that ultimate goal of adoption is to place children with families that will best
meet child's needs); Denise Tyler Kelly, Decedent's Estates: The Rights of Adopted Per-
sons Under Tennessee's Descent and Distribution and Adoption Statutes to Take by Intes-
tate Succession or By Will or Trust, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 340 (1992) (asserting
that goal of most modern legislation is integration of child into adoptive family). But see
Florida, Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Cox, 627 So.2d 1210, 1220 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (declaring it is important for adopted children to have stable heterosexual
households during teenage years).
10 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993), on remand, No. Civ. 91-1394, available in 1996 WL
694235 (Haw. 1996), aff'd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Ha. 1997).
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marry and raise a family are fundamental rights which should
not be denied to couples of the same-sex.
I. THE RIGHT TO MARRY
Today, states retain the exclusive power to regulate mar-
riage. 11 State statutes, however, must conform to constitutional
principles since the Supreme Court has determined that the
right to marry is a fundamental right. 12 The United States Su-
preme Court has recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects an individual's decision in the realm of marriage and
family. 13
A. Same-Sex Relationships Are Within the Definition of
'Marriage"
Marriage is most commonly defined as the legal union of a
man and a woman. 14 Society relies on this functional definition
11 See id. at *1 (stating marriage is "state conferred legal status which gives rise to
rights and benefits reserved exclusively to that particular relationship"); see also Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 392 (1978) (stating right to marriage is "to be defined and lim-
ited by state law"); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1884) (describing that marriage
has always been controlled by state legislature); Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105, 107
(D. Nev. 1980) (stating marriage is within province of state law); O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F.
Supp. 565, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (discussing states power to regulate marriage); Arthur G.
LeFrancois, The Constitution and the "Right" To Marry: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 5
ORLA. CITY U. L. REV. 507, 546 (1980) (explaining that marriage has traditionally been
subject of state regulation); Erik J. Toulon, Call the Caterer: Hawaii to Host First Same-
Sex Marriage, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 109, 111 (1993) (noting states have
typically interpreted gender-silent statutes as excluding same-sex marriages); Kevin
Zambrowicz, "To Love & Honor All the Days of Your Life" A Constitutional Right to
Same-Sex Marriage?, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 907, 909 (1994) (noting regulation of marriage
falls within province of state control).
12 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (noting State's right to
interfere with persons decisions relating to family and parenthood is restricted by Con-
stitution); Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (recognizing fundamental right to
marriage); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374 (asserting right to marry is fundamental).
13 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
816 (1978) (declaring that "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life is one of the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 62, 639-40 (1974) (holding mandatory leave of pregnant
school teachers violates due process since there was no valid relationship between time of
leave and state interest); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (prohibiting denial of
right to marriage based on race); Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205 (suggesting marriage is re-
lated to morals and civilization of people more than any other institution).
14 See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971). The court found that the
statute used the term "marriage" as a term of common usage, i.e., "the state of union be-
tween person of the opposite sex." Id. Courts also have defined marriage by looking into
case law and dictionary definitions and found that "marriage is and always has been a
contract between a man and a woman." Id. Courts have held that marriage is inherently
a relationship between persons of different sexes. DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 953
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of marriage to preserve the role of the traditional family as a
building block of the community 15 and to promote stability.16
Courts define the right to marry narrowly, 17 determining that
a valid marriage contemplates only a union between a man and
woman. 18 Some state legislatures have explicitly prohibited
marriage between individuals of the same-sex. 19 Others implic-
itly reject same-sex marriages through interpretation of the
applicable statute. 20 The right to marry, thus, has been denied to
same-sex couples 21 because they cannot fit within the narrow
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
15 See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Societal Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 476 (1983)
(asserting that marriage promotes community because marriage and kinship instruct
parents and children in authority, responsibility, and duty); see also County of Dane v.
Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Wis. 1993) (refusing to find landlord's refusal to lease to
unmarried persons a violation of state's anti-discrimination statute promoting the stabil-
ity of marriage and family); Zimmer, supra note 8, at 681 (suggesting procreation of fam-
ily should be founded on reality of family life rather than biological relations).
16 See Note, Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1508, 1607 (1989) (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384) [hereinafter Developments]
(stating that "any stable and significant relationship between two consenting adults
should be accorded constitutional protection"); Note, In Sickness and in Health, In Ha-
waii and Where Else?: Conflict of Laws and Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 109
HARv. L. REV. 2038, 2046 (1996) [hereinafter In Sickness and in Health] (suggesting that
functional definition of marriage promotes familial and societal stability and thus should
be used by states); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) (defining mar-
riage as "state-conferred legal partnership status").
17 See Zambrowicz, supra note 11, at 908 (noting marriage is defined narrowly).
18 See Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (defining marriage as "state of union between per-
sons of the opposite sex"); DeSanto, 476 A.2d at 952 (asserting "marriage is and always
has been a contract between a man and a woman"); see also The Defense of Marriage Act
of 1996, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) (defining marriage as "only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife").
19 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West 1996) (stating "[p]ersons of the same-sex
may not contract marriage with each other"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.01 (West 1993)
(noting "[a] license may not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same-sex"); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(5) (1995) (deeming "[m]arriages... prohibited and declared void...
between persons of the same-sex); VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 1995) (prohibiting
"[a] marriage between persons of the same sex... 'I.
20 See HAw. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1994) (warning that "[tihe marriage contract...
shall be only between a man and a woman"); IND. CODE § 31-7-1-2 (1997) (declaring that
"[o]nly a female may marry a male... [and] [o]nly a male may marry a female"); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (1997) (limiting "[o]nly a marriage between a man and a
woman [to be] ... valid in this state"); MNN. STAT. § 517-01 (1997) (establishing that
"[m]arriage so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil contract between a man
and a woman... 'I.
21 See Dean v. District of Columbia, No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *1 (D.C. Su-
per. Ct. 1992) (prohibiting same-sex marriage because historical definition of marriage
has involved union between man and woman), aff'd, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (interpreting marriage statute to ex-
clude same-sex marriages); DeSanto, 476 A.2d at 953-54 (holding same-sex couple could
never enter into common law marriage); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1974) (denying same-sex marriage and noting that legislature never intended state
statute to sanction same-sex marriages); see also Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185 (denying
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definition of marriage. 22
The rationale espoused by courts in prohibiting same-sex
marriage is that these couples are incapable of natural procrea-
tion and therefore cannot satisfy one of the indispensable ele-
ments of marriage. 23 This presupposes that all heterosexual
couples are able to and will procreate 24 once they have obtained
a marriage license. 25 Theoretically then, childless heterosexual
couples are in the same situation as childless homosexual cou-
ples. 26 Furthermore, many same-sex couples can and do raise
marriage license to two men based solely on their same-sex status).
22 See Constant A. v. Paul C. A., 496 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (noting that in-
herent in definition of marriage is union between man and woman for purpose of procre-
ating and raising families); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (1971)
(stating marriage is voluntary union between man and woman); Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191
(defining marriage as legal union between man and woman); see also Adams v. Hower-
ton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (contending that in both scriptural and ca-
nonical teachings, marriage of same-sex couples is "unthinkable and, by definition im-
possible").
23 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 535 (1942) (stating procreation is funda-
mental to very existence and survival of our race). But see Adrienne K. Wilson, Same Sex
Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 539, 544 (1991) (arguing that states can
not logically require same-sex couple to be able to procreate if not required for hetero-
sexuals to do same); Zambrowicz, supra note 11, at 922 (noting courts refuse to extend
marriage-procreation reasoning to deny homosexual couples right to marry).
24 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting argument that same-
sex couples are precluded from marrying because of their biological inability to satisfy
definition of that status), on remand, No. Civ. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235) (Haw. 1996),
aff'd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Ha. 1997); Teresa S. Collett, Marriage, Family and the Positive
Law, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 467, 476 (1996) (noting that states sanc-
tion marriages between heterosexual couples who are sterile or who plan on not having
any children); Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great Slumber-
ing Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection and Fundamental Interest, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 921, 954 (1995) [hereinafter Slumbering Baehr] (stating "there is no
procreational requirement for marriage, because opposite sex couples who will not or can
not procreate may nonetheless marry"); Mark Strasser, Family Definition and the Consti-
tution: On the Antimiscengenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1010 (1991)
[hereinafter Antimiscengenation Analogy] (noting states do not question heterosexual
couples about their plans for children prior to granting marriage licenses); In Sickness &
in Health, supra note 16, at 2055 n.46 (noting that states do not revoke marriage licenses
of those heterosexual couples who do not procreate); Zambrowicz, supra note 11, at 922
(stating, in many marriages, couples do not have children or are unable to have them).
25 See Wilson, supra note 23, at 544 (noting heterosexual couples need not show ca-
pability to procreate); see also Zambrowicz, supra note 11, at 921 (noting procreation and
child rearing are not defining characteristics of traditional marriage).
26 See Heeb, supra note 6, at 391 (acknowledging that "non-traditional forms [of
families] parallel traditional family in terms of furthering the same values and interest,
such as commitment, loyalty and intimacy"); Leo Sullivan, Comment, Same-Sex Marriage
and the Constitution, 6 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 280 (1973) (discussing that Equal Pro-
tection Clause requires persons "similarly situated" be treated alike); Zambrowicz, supra
note 11, at 922 (noting heterosexual couples are similarly situated to same-sex couples);
William N. Eskridge Jr., Would Legal Recognition of Same Sex Marriages Be Good for
America? Yes Marriage Will Normalize Social Relations Between Gay and Straight People
Throughout the Culture, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, June 10, 1996, at 24 (commenting on stable
family environments in which many same-sex couples raise their children); see also Wil-
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children, 27 through alternate means of procreation, 28 thereby
promoting the family unit just as heterosexuals do.2 9
B. Baehr v. Lewin
Recently, in Baehr v. Lewin,30 the Hawaii Supreme Court
considered whether same-sex couples have a right to marry. 31
Three same-sex couples challenged the constitutionality of an
Hawaii statute that denied marriage licenses based solely on the
fact that the applicant couples were of the same sex.3 2 The
plaintiff couples asserted that the Department of Health's inter-
pretation of the statute which would deny marriage licenses to
same-sex couples violated their right to privacy,33 equal protec-
tion under the law and due process of law. 34
The Supreme Court of Hawaii found that while there was no
son, supra note 23, at 544 (arguing that same-sex couples can provide stable home envi-
ronments for raising children similar to that provided by heterosexual couples).
27 See Wilson, supra note 23, at 544 (noting many same-sex couples have children);
see also Zimmer, supra note 8, at 705 (stating rise of medical technology has made les-
bian motherhood and gay fatherhood feasible through surrogacy).
28 See Anthony D. D'Amato, Conflict of Laws Rules and Interstate Recognition of
Same Sex Marriages, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 911, 933 (discussing methods same-sex couples
employ to have children, including artificial insemination and surrogacy); Marla J. Hol-
landworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-gay Arrangements: A Paradigm
For Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 183, 226 (1996) (discussing gay
couples parenting children through artificial insemination or surrogacy); Claudia A.
Lewis, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage,
97 YALE L.J. 1783, 1794 (1988) (discussing lesbian couple's efforts to have children via
artificial insemination).
29 See D'Amato, supra note 28, at 928 (acknowledging that same-sex relationships
support many of same values as traditional heterosexual relationships); Heeb, supra note
6, at 391 (stating same-sex couples form families that are functionally equivalent to tra-
ditional families insofar as they promote same values and interests); Donna Hitchens &
Barbara Price, Trial Strategy in Lesbian Mother Custody Cases: The Use of Expert Testi-
mony, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 451, 464 (1978-79) (citing studies indicating that in
some areas lesbians are healthier than heterosexual women); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexu-
ality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 218 (noting that many
homosexual couples form stable loving homes); Mary P. Treuthart, Adopting a More Re-
alistic Definition of 'Family", 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, 92 (1991) (contending that nontradi-
tional families promote same values and interests as traditional families).
30 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), on remand, No. Civ. 91-1394, available in 1996 WL
694235, at *1 (Haw. 1996).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 49-50 (stating that plaintiffs complaint alleged that Department of Health
denied applicant couples' marriage licenses solely on ground that they were of same sex
even though they complied with all marriage contract requirements and provisions).
33 Id. at 50 (alleging right to privacy is guaranteed by Article 1, § 6 of Hawaii Consti-
tution).
34 Id. (noting plaintiffs complaint asserted that Article 1 § 5 of Hawaii Constitution
guarantees due process of law and equal protection).
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fundamental right to same-sex marriage, 35 the state marriage
statute, prohibiting same-sex marriages, was unconstitutional,
both on its face and as applied. 36 The rationale offered was that
it was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii
Constitution, which stipulates that disparate treatment makes it
a suspect classification. 37
The specific provision violated by the Hawaii marriage
statute38 is one which prohibits "state sanctioned discrimination
against any persons in the exercise of his or her civil rights on
the basis of sex."39 The court concluded that sex is a "suspect
category" for purpose of equal protection analysis, thereby trig-
gering a "strict scrutiny" test.40 A strict scrutiny analysis re-
quires that there be a compelling government interest and that
the means undertaken be necessary to achieve that interest.
41
Under this analysis, the State did not meet its burden because it
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest to justify preventing
same-sex couples the right to marry.
42
35 Id. at 55-67. The Court held that there was no fundamental right to same-sex
marriages under Article 1, Section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution. Id. The court's reason-
ing was that a right to same-sex marriages is not so rooted in the traditions and collec-
tive conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice. Id.
36 See generally Zambrowicz, supra note 11, at 932-49. This Note demonstrates how
same-sex marriages are unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause. Id.
37 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57-67. The Court also held that the Hawaii marriage statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause under Article 1, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitu-
tion because it discriminated against same-sex marriages by establishing a sex-based
classification. Id.
38 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1995). The statute provides that "in order to make valid
the marriage contract, which shall only be between a man and a
woman... [requirements must be met]." Id.
39 See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (providing that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the
laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against
in the exercise thereof of race, religion, sex or ancestry."); Baehr v. Lewin, 1996 WL
694235, at *19.
40 See Baehr v. Lewin, 1996 WL 694235, at *19.
41 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973) (stating "where certain fundamental
rights are involved, the Court has held that regulations limiting these rights may be jus-
tified only by a 'compelling state interest' and that legislative enactment must be nar-
rowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake"); Anthony S. Winer,
Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 387, 389
(1994) (noting that state action interfering with fundamental right must be supported by
compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest).
42 See Baehr v. Lewin, 1996 WL 694235, at *20-21 (stating public interest in well-
being of children and families would not be negatively affected by same-sex marriage).
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II. RAMIFICATIONS OF LEGITIMIZING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
A. Full Faith and Credit Clause
Recently, changes have been made to the established jurispru-
dence in the area of same-sex marriage, as evinced by the Baehr
decision.43 Many states, therefore, are concerned that same-sex
couples will obtain a marriage license in Hawaii and utilize the
Full Faith and Credit Clause 44 to retain their martial status
upon return to their state of domicile. 45 The Full Faith and
Credit Clause requires states to honor "public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings" of other states. 46 It appears that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause would mandate that marriages recog-
nized in one state be honored in all other states. 47 The Clause,
43 See id. at *20 (noting same-sex marriages will not harm important governmental
interests); see also Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of
Law Implications of Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L. REV. 450,
450 (1994) (suggesting some states may soon recognize homosexual marriages). But see
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (denying gays marriage li-
cense).
44 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state." Id.
45 See Nancy Klingman and Kenneth May, For Better or for Worse, in Sickness and
in Health, Until Death Do Us Part: A Look at Same-Sex Marriage in Hawaii, 16 U. HAW.
L. REV. 447, 483 (1994) (discussing belief that homosexual couples will marry in Hawaii
and be able to retain their marital status after returning home); see also In Sickness and
in Health, supra note 16, at 2041 (noting states should recognize Hawaii marriages and
respect "the couples' reliance interest in continuation of their marriage"); Habib A.
Balian, Note, Till Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith and Credit to Marital Status,
68 CAL. L. REV. 397, 400 (1995) (noting states possess power to follow their citizens into
other states to define their marriage). See generally Murphet v. Murphet, 502 P.2d 255,
260 (Or. 1972) (stating each state must accord judgments of another state with full faith
and credit).
46 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See Robert L. Cordell II, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fun-
damental Right of Marriage and an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 247, 264 (1994) (noting Full Faith and
Credit Clause requires that state recognize judicial decrees of another state); Deborah M.
Henson, Will Same Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit
and Due Process Limitations on States Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents
of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM.
L. 551, 583 (1994) (discussing possible implications of recognizing same-sex marriages in
Hawaii and impact of Full Faith and Credit Clause); Jon T. Alexander, Comment, Issue
Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Default Judgments: A Dilemma for the Bankruptcy
Courts, 44 U.C.L.A. L.REV. 159, 166 (1996) (stating Full Faith and Credit Clause man-
dates that states must recognize judicial proceedings of another state); Henry J. Reske, A
Matter of Full Faith and Credit, A.B.A. J., July, 1996 at 34 (noting purpose of Full Faith
and Credit Clause is to require states to honor each other's "public acts, records and ju-
dicial proceedings").
47 See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 210, 9A U.L.A. 176 (West Ann. 1982
& Supp. 1997) (exemplifying uniformity of language followed by many states: "Marriages
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however, contains an exception which allows a state to reject the
laws of other states if these laws are in violation of its own pub-
lic policy interests. 48 The Supreme Court, however, has never in-
voked the Clause to require a state to recognize a valid marriage
occurring in another state.49
Interstate marriages involve choice of law jurisprudence. 50
Choice of law analysis requires that one law, either the law of
domicile or the law of the state of occurrence be applied to trans-
actions occurring in another state.5 1 With respect to marriage,
the law of the state in which the ceremony occurred will apply
unless the marriage offends an important public policy of the
state of domicile, or if the state has enacted appropriate legisla-
tion which declares that the marriage will not be recognized. 52
A state maintains its interest in regulating marriage by retain-
contracted within the State... or outside the State, that were valid at the time of the
contract or subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted
or by the domicile of the parties, are valid in this State"); Beth A. Allen, Same-Sex Mar-
riage: A Conflict of Laws Analysis for Oregon, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 619, 670 (1996)
(noting prior to DOMA, all states were required to recognize same-sex marriage from an-
other state when Full Faith and Credit Clause applied); Mark Strasser, Judicial Good
Faith and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where It's Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313,
313 (1997) [hereinafter Baehr Essentials] (stating on its face, Full Faith and Credit
Clause implies that all states would recognize same-sex marriages once one state has
recognized it); see also McDonald v. McDonald, 58 P.2d 163, 164 (Cal. 1936)
(demonstrating that California court held marriage valid in California because it was
valid in Nevada); In re Estate of Shippy, 678 P.2d 848 (Wash. 1984) (illustrating Califor-
nia's validation of marriage in Alaska); In re Estate of Ferguson, 130 N.W.2d 300 (Wis.
1964) (giving validity to Michigan marriage in Wisconsin).
48 See Balian, supra note 45, at 401 (noting states must grant Full Faith and Credit
only if other state's interest is superior to its own).
49 See Allen, supra note 47, at 671 (noting Supreme Court has not ruled on effect of
Full Faith and Credit Clause on interstate marriages); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of
Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435,
1435 (1997) (commenting that Supreme Court never articulated implications of Full
Faith and Credit Clause for marriages).
50 See Baehr Essentials, supra note 47, at 314 (asserting that recognizing marriages
of other states requires full faith and credit analysis and choice of law rules); Mark
Strasser, Loving the Romer Out or Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the Consti-
tution, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 281 (1997) [hereinafter Loving the Romer] (stating choice
of law issues are involved in recognition of out-of-state marriages). See generally
Hovermill, supra note 43, at 454 (discussing choice of law analysis to validate out of state
marriages).
51 See Baehr Essentials, supra note 47, at 314 (asserting choice of law rules implies
one state law be applied to transactions occurring in another state).
52 See id. at 314 (commenting that if strong public policy of state is implicated, law of
domicile will apply); Loving the Romer, supra note 50, at 281 (noting that because of
choice of law rules, states which enact appropriate legislation do not have to recognize
same-sex marriage in another state); see also Allen, supra note 47, at 673 (discussing
that forum state may refuse to recognize otherwise valid marriage performed in sister
state if violative of forum state's public policy).
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ing the power to statutorily mandate eligibility requirements.
53
A state has an interest in regulating marriage and protecting
family stability. When a marriage offends these goals or violates
the state's public policy, the marriage would not be recognized.
54
Same-sex marriages, however, do not offend these goals and
therefore should be recognized regardless of where the marriage
was created.55
Although the Full Faith Credit Clause would support recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages occurring in another state, Congress
undercut the effect of the clause through the enactment of the
Defense of Marriage Act.56
B. Defense of Marriage Act
In response to Baehr, Congress enacted the Defense of Mar-
riage Act ("Act"). 57 The purpose of the Act was to protect the in-
53 See Hovermill, supra note 43, at 454 (stating every state has right to determine
who can enter into matrimonial relationship within its borders); In Sickness and in
Health, supra note 16, at 2039 (asserting state law governs marriage by placing limita-
tions on ability to marry).
54 See Hovermill, supra note 43, at 455 (commenting that choice of law rule provides
exception to refuse to honor valid foreign marriages if it violates forum state's public
policy); Baehr Essentials, supra note 47, at 362 (discussing states interest in preserving
integrity of marriage); In Sickness and in Health, supra note 16, at 2039 (asserting state
interest in promoting stability, safety, and health to justify prohibiting certain types of
marriages).
55 See Balian, supra note 45, at 400 (commenting on state's power to define marital
relations outside state promotes harmony between states); Baehr Essentials, supra note
47, at 362 (noting same-sex marriages support general interests of state). See generally
James D. Esseks, Recent Developments Redefining the Family, HAR. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
183, 195 (1990) (stating that nontraditional families deserve same respect and dignity
that traditional families receive); David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial
Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 348 (1994) (noting
there is no significant difference between mental health of lesbian mothers as compared
with heterosexual mothers).
56 See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 2000 (1997) (commenting that DOMA re-
peals Full Faith and Credit Clause for same-sex marriages); Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 49,
at 1435 (stating DOMA discourages interstate recognition of marriage by partially re-
scinding Full Faith and Credit Clause); Loving the Romer, supra note 50, at 292
(implying DOMA is "likely to destabilize the certainty and status of marriage").
57 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (1996) (stating that "no state... shall be required to give
effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other state ... respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other state..."); see also Paula L. Ettlebrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on
Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POLY 107, 166 (1996) (discussing implica-
tions of Defense of Marriage Act which allows "states to ignore same-sex marriages ap-
proved by other states"); Reske, supra note 46, at 34 (describing Defense of Marriage Act
which specifies that states are not required to give effect to same-sex unions and bars
federal benefits to those couples); James Kunen, Hawaiian Courtship Gay Marriage May
Become Legal In the Islands-Without Necessarily Coming to a Chapel Near You, TIME
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stitution of traditional heterosexual marriage. 58 The Act allows
an individual state to utilize its own public policy to determine
whether or not to extend full faith and credit to same-sex mar-
riages.59 A state is therefore permitted to circumvent the prin-
ciples espoused by the Full Faith and Credit Clause and deny
recognition of same-sex marriages occurring outside its bor-
ders.60
The Act goes beyond pre-existing law by denying application of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to marriages, despite the lack
of Supreme Court guidance on the matter. 61 Prior to the Act,
each state retained the power to decide whether to recognize out-
of-state, same-sex marriages. 62 The principle of equality of the
MAGAZINE, Dec. 16, 1996, at 44 (noting that although same-sex marriages may ulti-
mately be permitted in Hawaii, it is unlikely that these marriages will be recognized in
other states because of Defense of Marriage Act).
58 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (1996) (altering normal rules for recognizing acts in sister
states); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 283 (1971) (noting "strong pub-
lic policy" of state governs whether upholding marriage valid); see also Stilley v. Stilley,
244 S.W.2d 958, 960 (Ark. 1952) (finding common law marriage contracted in Kansas to
be valid in Arkansas); Gallegos v. Wilkerson, 445 P.2d 970, 973 (N.M. 1968) (reasoning
that heterosexual parties' rental of apartment, agreement as to marriage, cohabitation,
and holding themselves out as husband and wife supporting finding of valid common law
marriage). See generally Cynthia M. Reed, When Love, Comity, and Justice Conquer Bor-
ders: INS Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 128-130
(1996) (noting definition of marriage in DOMA means "only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife").
59 See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996) (stating that purpose of Defense of Mar-
riage Act was to "define and protect the institution of marriage"); see also 142 CONG. REC.
S10579-01 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Pell) (arguing that passage of De-
fense of Marriage Act was premature because no state has yet to recognize same-sex
marriages); John J. Ross, The Employment Law Year in Review, in 25TH ANNUAL IN-
STITUTE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, AT 9, 9 (PLI LITIG. & ADMIN. PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES No. 547, 1996) (noting that Defense of Marriage Act "defines marriage
for federal purposes as 'legal union between one man and one woman', which would affect
federal benefits"). But see 142 CONG. REC. S10552-01 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Dorgan) (supporting Defense of Marriage Act because historically, marriage has
been union between man and woman); 142 CONG. REC. S10 100-02, S10100 (daily ed.
Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott) (noting that Defense of Marriage was "a response
to an attack upon the institution of marriage itself').
60 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 73 (1996) (arguing that Defense of Marriage Act is
unconstitutional because it violates Full Faith and Credit Clause of Constitution); see
also Eric Schmitt, Senate Passes Bill Against Gay Marriages/ Measure to Ban Anti Gay
Job Discrimination Defeated, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al
(noting that opponents of Defense of Marriage Act contend that it is unnecessary and un-
constitutional); Patricia Wen, Measure Barring Gay Marriages Seen as Vulnerable,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1996, at B1 (stating that Harvard Law School Professor Law-
rence Tribe believes that Defense of Marriage Act violates Full Faith and Credit Clause
of Constitution).
61 See Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 49, at 1449 (asserting DOMA impermissibly over-
stepped constitutional mandate of full faith and credit).
62 See Kramer, supra note 56, at 2000 (noting DOMA authorizes states to ignore
"judgments involving the marital rights or status of a same-sex couple"); Ruskay-Kidd,
supra note 49, at 1450 (commenting that DOMA changes state's ability to recognize va-
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states, espoused by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, is nullified
by the Act, in that it authorizes a state to deny recognition of a
valid, out-of-state, same-sex marriage.
63
III. A FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
64
guarantees all citizens the right to life, liberty, and property
without governmental interference. 65 Embodied in the Four-
teenth Amendment is the right of privacy which is recognized as
a fundamental right.66 This right of privacy includes the rights
to family autonomy,67 freedom from governmental interference
lidity of same-sex marriage from another state through use of Full Faith and Credit
Clause).
63 See Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 49, at 1438 (implying that Congress, through DOMA,
judges individual state laws).
64 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (setting forth that states shall not deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law).
65 See generally Arnette E. Clark, Autonomy and Death, 11 TUL. L. REV. 45, 71-72
(1996) (discussing right to die under Due Process Clause); Daniel W. Fessler, Federalism
in the Second Republic's Third Century, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 95, 103-04
(1996) (discussing Justice Douglas' interpretations of Due Process Clause); Toni M. Mas-
saro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 63-64 (1996) (addressing use of
Due Process Clause to obtain protection of gay rights).
66 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (stating "right of privacy [is] found in
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state ac-
tion"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (recognizing that Fourteenth Amendment
creates "right of privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particu-
larly reserved to the people"); State v. Mueller, 671 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Haw. 1983) (holding
that "a right to personal privacy or a guarantee is implicit in the United States Constitu-
tion"); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 858 (1992) (stating that lib-
erty interest includes rights to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
and child rearing and education); Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 966 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing constitutionally protected liberty interest includes
freedom from governmental interference with personal matters of individual); Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (acknowledging right of privacy includes
freedom from governmental intrusions into personal decisions); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599-600 (1977) (noting personal privacy includes "interest in independence in mak-
ing certain kinds of important decisions"). See generally Claudia Tuchman, Note, Does
Privacy Have Four Walls? Salvaging Stanley v. Georgia, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2267, 2279
(1994) (discussing development of right of privacy in constitutional jurisprudence); An-
nemarie Brennan, Note, Is All Privacy Created Equal?, 20 VT. L. REv. 815, 820 (1996)
(discussing evolution of privacy doctrine).
67 See Thornborough v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 791 (1986) (recognizing Court's history of upholding claims predicated on per-
sonal autonomy in connection with conduct of family life and child rearing); see also
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (noting line of jurisprudence
which acknowledges personal autonomy of family without unwarranted governmental
intrusion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (stating parents have liberty in-
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with regard to marriage, 68 and child-bearing.69 The right of pri-
vacy protects an individual's freedom of choice with regards to
who an individual chooses to marry and protects against unwar-
ranted interference by the government in this area.70 States,
moreover, may interfere with the right to marry only if the en-
terest in directing upbringing and education of their children free from unwarranted
governmental intrusions); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 510 (1925) (asserting
"the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of their chil-
dren"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 390 (1923) (acknowledging rights of family and
marriage). See generally Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Mani-
festo, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 937 (1996) (noting parent's have constitutionally protected
right to control and direct their children's education); David L. Nessessian, Mom Versus
Grandma-or-Parent Preference Versus Best Interest: An Examination of the Case for
Grandparent Custody, 13 PROB. L.J. 133, 153 (1996) (noting "that parents have a right to
privacy and family autonomy").
68 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 927 (noting throughout this century Court has recognized
that fundamental right of privacy protects citizens from governmental intrusion in mat-
ters related to childrearing, marriage and contraceptive choice); Turner v. Safely, 482
U.S. 78, 94 (1978) (noting right of marriage is fundamental); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (reaffirming under right of privacy individuals have freedom from
unjustified governmental interference with personal decisions involving marriage); Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 185 (1973) (holding Georgia statute invaded right of privacy and
liberty in matters related to family, marriage and sex); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (recognizing marriage as personal right "essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that "marriage is one of
the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival").
69 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-154 (noting that right of privacy protects activities relat-
ing to procreation, but that this right was not absolute); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 443 (1972) (stating that single individual's right to obtain contraceptive is part of
right of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing mari-
tal privacy includes right to obtain contraceptives); see also Peggy Cooper Davis, Ne-
glected Stories and Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 364
(1993) (discussing constitutional protection of right of privacy concerning procreation is-
sue); Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to Be Born? Legislative Inaction and the
Posthumous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 933, 933 (1996) (detailing constitutional jurispru-
dence which supports existence of "fundamental right of individual, married or single to
make procreative choices"); Note, Reproductive Technology and Procreative Rights of the
Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 669 (1985) (arguing that unmarried person's have
constitutionally protected right to birth control).
70 See Turner, 428 U.S. at 82 (holding even in prison setting, marriage regulations
are unconstitutional infringement upon fundamental right to marry); Anne M. Burton,
Gay Marriage-A Modern Proposal: Applying Baehr v. Lewin to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 177, 180 (1995)
(confirming state power to regulate marriage and noting constitutional protection of right
to marry as fundamental right); Rev. Robert F. Drinan, S.J., The Loving Decision and the
Freedom to Marry, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 358, 360 (1968) (interpreting Loving to represent
freedom of personal choice in selecting spouse); Heeb, supra note 6, at 376 (arguing that
Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment provides constitutional support to notion
that same-sex couples have right to marry); Hovermill, supra note 43, at 469-70
(indicating right to privacy includes right of homosexuals to marry); Zambrowicz, supra
note 11, at 932 (arguing that rationale which supported right of interracial couples to
marry in Loving is equally applicable to that of same-sex couples). But see Lynn D.
Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims For Same Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU
L. REV. 1, 6 (contending there is no sound constitutional doctrine to support assertion
that laws which prohibit same-sex couples from marrying are unconstitutional).
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croachment survives the highest level of scrutiny.71 In additionto federal constitutional protection, states often afford evengreater protection of the right to marry in their individual state
constitutions. 72
The Baehr court failed to recognize the existence of a funda-
mental right to same-sex marriages under the Due ProcessClause of the Hawaii Constitution.73 The court reasoned that al-though the fundamental right to marry fell within the constitu-tionally protected right to privacy, it was strictly limited to a
union between a man and a woman. 74 The court further notedthat granting same-sex couples the right to marry would there-fore create a "new" fundamental right, an extension they did not
want to grant. 75
B. Equal Protection Analysis
Although the due process analysis was insufficient, the court
utilized the Equal Protection Clause to "look forward" and up-
71 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 952 (1992) (finding that substan-tive liberties under Due Process Clause may only be abridged in manner that withstandsstrict scrutiny); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 460-61 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)(noting strict scrutiny should be read into Due Process Clause); see also Stuart MinorBenjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians,106 YALE L.J. 537, 612 (1996) (discussing whether Due Process Clause also includesequal protection component of strict scrutiny).72 See Winfield v. Division of Parvi-Mutual Wagering, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 477So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985) (acknowledging that Florida Constitution provides greaterprotection from governmental intrusion than that of Federal Constitution); see also Mozov. Florida, 632 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting right of privacy protectedby Florida's Constitution is broader than that of Federal Constitution), a/I'd, 655 So. 2d1115 (Fla. 1995); Hawaii v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 377 (Haw. 1988) (stating that Hawaii'sconstitutional protection of right of privacy is broader than that of Federal Constitution);Bedford v. Sugarman, 772 P.2d 486, 493 n.10 (Wash. 1989) (noting California's constitu-tional right of privacy is significantly broader than right of privacy protected by FederalConstitution); Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65 TEMP. L.REV. 1279, 1298 (1992) (noting that privacy right protected by state constitution isbroader than that of Federal Constitution); Michael K. Steenson, Fundamental Rights inthe "Gray" Area: The Right of Privacy Under the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM.MITCHELL L. REV. 383, 403 (1994) (stating Illinois state constitution explicitly guaran-teed right of privacy and thus state constitution offers greater protection of individualrights does Federal Constitution).73 Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at *1,*19 (Haw. 1996) (holding that under Arti-cle 1, § 6 of Hawaii Constitution there is "no fundamental right to marriage for same-sex
couples").74 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56 (Haw. 1993) (noting fundamental right to marry"presently contemplates unions between men and women").75 Id. at 57 (asserting that same-sex marriages are not rooted on traditions and cus-toms of society).
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hold same-sex marriages due to sex-based classifications. 76
The Equal Protection Clause states that "[n]o state shall make
or enforce any law which shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." 77 The Equal Protec-
tion Clause is designed to protect people from being denied the
same privileges and benefits under the laws that are given to
other people in like circumstances. 78 State regulations are sub-
ject to different standards of review based on the classification
made to determine if there is an equal protection violation.
79
Strict scrutiny review is invoked when legislation infringes on
the rights of a suspect class, 80 and will be upheld only if the
state interest is compelling and the means undertaken are nar-
rowly tailored to achieve that interest. 81
76 See Megan E. Farrell, Baehr v. Lewin: Questionable Reasoning; Sound Judgment,
11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 589, 615 (noting that Equal Protection Clause oper-
ates "to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices, however deeply en-
grained and long standing").
77 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78 See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting) (noting guarantee of equal protec-
tion of laws); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
(discussing mandate of Equal Protection Clause); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 92 S. Ct. 1029,
1035, 405 U.S. 438, 446-48 (1972) (recognizing that Equal Protection Clause does not
deny states power to create certain classifications).
79 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (discussing that standards of review under equal
protection depend upon classification at issue); see also Adarand Construction, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-18 (1995) (discussing cases involving classifications burdening
groups that suffer societal discrimination and noting appropriate standards of review
pursuant to these classifications and Equal Protection analysis). See generally United
States v. Paradise, 580 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) (noting that Equal Protection compo-
nent of Due Process Clause of Fifth amendment is coexistent with Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (stating equal protection
analysis is same under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 500 (1954) (finding that Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment imposes same
equal protection requirement on federal government as Equal Protection Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment imposes on state governments).
80 See Holdman v. Olim, 581 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Haw. 1978). The court, in deciding
which standard to apply when there is a denial of equal protection of the laws, recognized
that "laws classifying on the basis of suspect categories or impinging upon fundamental
rights, expressly granted by the Constitution are presumed to be unconstitutional unless
the state shows a compelling interest justifying such classifications." Id. However an-
other test that the courts have applied is a standard between rational basis and strict
scrutiny, in which "important" interest must be served. Id.; Beverly A. Uhl, A New Issue
in Foster Parenting-Gays, 25 J. FAM. L. 577, 594 (1986-87). The criteria for suspect class
requires that "the objectives must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives." Id.
81 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1994) (explaining that
under strict scrutiny courts determine whether restriction is necessary to serve compel-
ling governmental interest, and if it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end); Metro
Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that strict
scrutiny requires statute be "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental in-
terest" in order to pass constitutional muster); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432-33 (excluding
group because mental retardation did not represent legitimate government interest);
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The Baehr court's equal protection analysis found that gender
was a suspect category and thus should be reviewed using strict
scrutiny analysis. 82 The court held the Hawaii marriage statute
unconstitutional because it discriminated against same-sex
marriages by establishing a sex-based classification. 83 Although
the statute was applied equally to both sexes, this did not elimi-
nate the invidious discrimination resulting from compliance with
the statute.84
Under strict scrutiny analysis,8 5 the State was unable to prove
that the sex-based classification was justified by a compelling in-
terest and that it was narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary in-
fringements of constitutional rights. 86
The State failed to establish that same-sex marriages would
result in harm to governmental or public interests, or effect the
well-being and development of children and families.87 The
State's asserted interests in fostering morality, encouraging
family stability, supporting bans on homosexual activity, and
fostering procreation were not sufficiently compelling interests to
justify the classification here at issue. 88
Salisbury v. List 501 F. Supp. 105, 105-110 (D. Nev. 1980) (holding state statute that
denied prison inmates right to marry unconstitutional due to lack of compelling state in-
terest and existence of less burdensome ways to protect state's concern regarding secu-
rity and discipline); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1967) (classifying
based upon national origin is suspect); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding
classification based on race is suspect).
82 Baehr v. Lewin, 1996 WL 694235, at *19 (concluding that "sex is a 'suspect cate-
gory' for purposes of equal protection analysis under Article 1, § 5 of the Hawaii Consti-
tution").
83 Id. at *19-21 (finding Hawaii marriage statute creates sex-based classification and
is not "narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights").
84 See Farrell, supra note 76, at 605-06 (noting Baehr court drew analogy to Loving
and declared Hawaii marriage statute discriminates on basis of sex even though it pun-
ishes participants equally).
85 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 65 (Haw. 1993) (stating for purposes of equal protec-
tion analysis, sex-based classifications are subject to heightened form of scrutiny).
86 Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (stating presumption that Hawaii marriage stat-
ute is unconstitutional was not overcome by State because State could not prove that it
"furthers a compelling state interest").
87 Id. (noting state failed to demonstrate that same-sex marriages would have nega-
tive impact on institution of traditional marriage or important public interests).
88 See Zambrowicz, supra note 11, at 943-949 (explaining four primary public policy
reasons proffered by states for denial of same-sex marriage); see also John D. Ingram, A
Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right to Marry - Why Can't Fred Marry
George - or Many and Alice at the Same Time, 10 CONTEMP. L. 33, 34-35 (1984) (stating
that statutory prohibition of same-sex marriage is "based on outdated concepts of moral-
ity, sexual stereotypes and misguided sense of tradition"); Arthur S. Leonard, Lesbian
and Gay Families and the Law: A Progress Report, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927, 940-41
(1994) (noting that courts have historically justified denial of same-sex marriage based
on states' desire to preserve marriage for procreation and child-rearing).
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IV. THE RIGHT TO RAISE A FAMILY
A. Definition of Family
The constitutionally protected right to marry encompasses the
right to establish a home and raise children.89 In order to ade-
quately understand this constitutional protection, it is necessary
to examine society's definition of "family."90
Today, the term "family" has expanded beyond the traditional
boundaries. 9 1 Families now range in form from those headed by
single parents, grandparents, and gay and lesbian parents. 92 The
dramatic increase in non-traditional families has, therefore, led
89 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (holding state law denying mar-
riage to any man under obligation to pay support by any court order or judgment uncon-
stitutional); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (holding zoning
ordinance prohibiting grandchild dwelling with grandmother violated due process); Bod-
die v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (finding state's denial of access to courts by
indigent women seeking divorce violative of due process); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (establishing statute prohibiting teaching of language other than English
unconstitutional); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (proposing that marriage is
more related to morals and civilization of people than any other institution).
90 See People v. Hasse, 291 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cty. 1968) (defining
term "family" as referring to parents and children, "constituting the fundamental social
unit in a civilized society"); see also Moore, 431 U.S. at 506 (announcing that Constitution
prevents states from forcing all to subscribe to certain narrowly defined family patterns).
91 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04 (acknowledging extended familial structure rather
than strictly traditional nuclear composite); Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing line of Supreme Court cases that define boundaries
for interference into family matters); In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790,
791 (Minn. App. 1991) (finding lesbian partner's right of guardianship of disabled partner
was essentially that of family); Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. & Co., 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788-89,
543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (recognizing household of gay couple formed family
unit); see also ARLENE S. SKOLNICK & JEROME H. SKOLNICK, FAMILY IN TRANSITION 7-8
(1971) (noting traditional foundation of nuclear family); Heeb, supra note 6, at 390 (citing
cases acknowledging alternative family forms); Kristen Korn, Comment, The Struggle for
the Child: Preserving the Family in Adoption, Disputes Between Biological Parties and
Third Parties, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1291 (1994) (discussing shift in definition due to
reality of "family"); Zimmer, supra note 8, at 699 (noting formation of today's families
occur in many different manners); Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at 47 (suggesting that most successful social arrange-
ment ensuring survival and social development of child is family unit of biological mother
and father); cf. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843
(1978) (stating biological relationships "are not exclusive determinations of the existence
of a family").
92 See In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1992) (holding father's existing rights
made adoption proceeding fatally flawed); see also Moore, 431 U.S. at 505 (exploring so-
cial conditions which create need for extended family units); Robert Dawidoff, Do Gay
Partners and Parents Have a Place in the Family of Values? Yes: Family Roles Aren't
Automatic or Biological and Traditional Families Aren't a Model of Success in Protecting
Children, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1996, at B7 (discussing qualities of gay families which can
benefit American society).
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to an evolution in the meaning of family.93
B. Protection of the Family Unit
The right to privacy 94 gives rise to both the right to marry and
the right to family autonomy.95 Due to the strong policy favoring
family autonomy, the right to privacy dictates that intimate mat-
ters within a family should not be subject to governmental inter-
ference, 96 so that family values and stability are promoted. 97 For
this reason, these areas of family life are protected from state in-
trusion by substantive and procedural due process. 98
Despite the evolving nature of the term "family," the homosex-
ual community continues to be negatively affected by the more
93 See Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Marriages and the Right to Privacy: Aban-
doning Scriptural, Canonical, and Natural Law Based on Definitions of Marriage, 35
How. L.J. 173, 221 (1992) [hereinafter Right to Privacy] (discussing need to expand defi-
nition of family beyond traditional notion); Lauren Anderson, Note, Property Rights of
Same-Sex Couples: Toward a New Definition of Family, 26 J. FAM. L. 357, 367 (1988)
(asserting "judicial system is in flux regarding its notions of what constitutes a family");
Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Cou-
ples and Evolving Definitions of 'T amily", 29 J. FAM. L. 497, 497 (1991) (discussing
changing definition of family).
94 See M.L.B v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 556-57 (1996) (stating that choices regarding
marriage, family life and child upbringing are essential to our society); Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (reaffirming notion that Constitution limits
states' rights to interfere with individual's personal decisions concerning family life);
Moore, 431 U.S. at 494 (noting that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life are constitutionally protected by liberty interest of Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment); Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (acknowledging state interference is restricted pursuant to privacy realm of family
life).
95 See Zimmer, supra note 8, at 699 (proposing right to marriage gives rise to family
unit); see also Eisenstadt v. Connecticut, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding right to pri-
vacy encompasses right to decide to bear children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (holding right to instruct child in foreign language is protected by due process).
96 See Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1543 (1994) (stating "rights to marital privacy, and to marry
and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as fundamental rights specifically
protected by the Constitution"); Lawrence C. Nolan, Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother:
But Court-Ordered Grandparents Visitation in the Intact Family?, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 51,
53 (1993) (pointing out that families regulate their internal affairs).
97 See Zimmer, supra note 8, at 699 (asserting family builds social stability, helps
members develop social skills and acts as emotional and economic support system); see
also David Link, The Tie That Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the Family Commitments
of Same-Sex Couples, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1055, 1100 (1990) (discussing family values
and sexual orientation).
98 See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 833, 834
(1992) (noting substantive due process protection granted to family relationships); Lehr
v. Robertons, 463 U.S. 248, 258-260 (1983) (discussing procedural and substantive pro-
tection of Due Process Clause of family relationships); Moore, 431 U.S. at 546-547 (White,
J., dissenting) (discussing substantive and procedural due process protection afforded to
family units); see also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 845 (1978) (regarding family privacy as "intrinsic human right").
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traditional and restrictive definition.99 Consequently, these cou-
ples are denied their fundamental right to marry. 100
C. Same-Sex Couples and Adoption of Children
Notwithstanding the aforementioned barriers, there has been
a significant increase in the number of gay and lesbian couples
raising children. 10 1 Same-sex couples utilize adoption, 102 the
most permanent form of non-biological parenthood, 10 3 to estab-
99 See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbian and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 238 (1994) (stating "the single best predictor of
homophobia is a belief in the traditional family ideology"); Law, supra note 29, at 218
(suggesting that opposition to homosexuality stems from traditional ideas of family sta-
bility); Link, supra note 97, at 1081 (noting that use of positive words, such as "family"
and "marriage" do not pertain to homosexuals); see also Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orien-
tation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 311 (1996)
(acknowledging that prohibition of same-sex marriages serves legitimate governmental
goal of promoting stable family structures).
100 See Ingram, supra note 88, at 47 (discussing irrationality of permitting hetero-
sexual couples incapable of having children to benefit from marriage while denying right
to same-sex couples); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Recognizing Gay and Lesbian Families: Mar-
riage and Parental Rights, 5 LAw & SEX. 513, 513 (1996) (addressing barriers and solu-
tions to gay marriage and parenting).
101 See Flaks, supra note 55, at 345 (estimating there are as many as five million
lesbian mothers and one to three million gay fathers in United States); see also Develop-
ments, supra note 16, at 1629 (citing psychosocial study estimating three million gays
and lesbians in United States are parents, and eight to ten million children are raised by
gay or lesbian parents); Kovacs, supra note 100, at 515 (indicating eight to ten million
children have gay or lesbian parents). See generally Joseph Evall, Sexual Orientation and
Adoptive Matching, 25 FAm. L.Q. 347, 352 (1991) (noting that only Florida and New
Hampshire have statutes barring homosexuals from adopting).
102 See In re M.M.D. v. B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 857 (D.C. 1995) (providing that adop-
tion transfers to adoptive parent all legal rights, duties, and consequences of parental
relationship; severs rights and obligations of natural parent who no longer will have cus-
tody of child; and determines all other legal effects of adoption upon families of natural
parents and adoptive parents); see also Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption By Lesbian and Gay
People: The Use and Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY
207, 207 (1995) (noting traditional adoption extinguishes rights of biological parent and
creates rights in adoptive parent).
103 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 844 n.51 (1978) (asserting language of New York adoption statute, that "adoption is
recognized as the legal equivalent of biological parenthood"); Phillip S. Welt, Adoption
and the Constitutions: Are Adoptive Parents Really "Strangers Without Rights?, 95 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 165, 165 (1995) (pointing out Supreme Court's recognition that adoption is
equivalent to natural parenthood); Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging
Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 925 (1991)
(concluding that once adoption proceedings are finalized, all rights and responsibilities
with regard to child attach); Fran Pfeifer Pero, Note, In the Best Interest of the Child:
Litigation in the Post Placement Adoption Setting, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 383, 383
(1994) (defining adoption as vesting all parental rights and duties in adoptive parents
providing equivalent status as biological parents); see also In re Adoption of Robert Paul
P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 (N.Y. 1984) (finding that adoption statute creates principle that
parent-child relationship can be formed by operation of law); In re Upjohn's Will, 107
N.E.2d 492, 494 (N.Y. 1952) (observing that ability of state to ordain, by operation of law,
relationship between adult and non-biological child has existed in New York since nine-
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lish secure and permanent families. 104 Fortunately, a significant
number of these couples are overcoming the barriers emanating
from society's perception of homosexuality, as evidenced by the
increasing number of same-sex adoptive parents. 105 However,
considerations regarding parental fitness have not been uni-
formly applied to heterosexual and homosexual couples. 106
There is no common law right to adopt children; adoption is
solely a creature of statute. 107 Adoption is not a fundamental
right and therefore states are granted vast discretion in limiting
adoption rights.108 Generally, adoption statutes are silent on the
teenth century).
104 See Brown v. County of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653, 659 (E.D. Cal. 1985)
(asserting that if reunification with natural parent is undesirable, focus is to place child
in stable and permanent home); Estate of Pierce, 196 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (stating that for
purposes of interpreting testamentary intent, adopted child obtains all rights related to
parent-child relationship); In re Adoption of V.R.O., 822 P.2d 83, 86-87 (Mont. 1991)
(finding that adopting parent assumes legal relationship to child); Evall, supra note 101,
at 349 (noting that adoption is attempt at imitating birth, providing fresh start for chil-
dren in need of homes); David P. Russman, In Whose Best Interests?, 27 SUFFOLK U.
L.REv. 31, 49 (1993) (recognizing that modern adoption is primarily for purpose of provid-
ing permanent home for children whose natural parents could not take care of them); see
also Mitchell A. Charney, The Rebirth of Private Adoptions, 71 JUNE A.B.A. J. 52, 53
(1985) (noting satisfaction of placing children with permanent stable homes).
105 See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 551 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1993) (finding that adoption would provide financial and emotional benefits to children of
same-sex couples, and further stating "the rights of parents cannot be denied, limited, or
abridged on the basis of sexual orientation"). See generally In re Guardianship of Astonn
H., 167 Misc.2d 840, 635 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1995) (reasoning that pro-
spective parents' sexual orientation was not determinative of her fitness to be child's
guardian); In re Camilla, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897, 900 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994) (noting that an
unmarried adult may not be denied adoption rights based solely on sexual orientation).
106 See Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (1980)
(holding homosexuality does not render parent per se unfit); In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d
997, 999 (N.Y. Sur. 1992) (noting "New York specifically prohibits discrimination against
homosexuals in granting adoption"); see also Henry J. Reske, Lesbian Loses Custody, 79
A.B.A. J. 24, 25 (1993) (addressing family law expert, Sanford N. Katz's, statement that
courts are permitting lesbians to adopt children of their partners, hence indicating trend
toward acceptance of gay parenting arrangements).
107 See In re Jacob, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718, 660 N.Y.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995) (citing In
re Eaton, 111 N.E.2d 431 (N.Y. 1953)) (labeling adoption as "solely a creature of statute");
see also Butterfield v. Sawyer, 58 N.E. 602, 604 (Ill. 1900) (explaining that modern adop-
tion was "unknown at common law" but derived from ancient legal systems); Petition of
Leach, 128 N.W.2d 475, 276-77 (Mich. 1964) (indicating that adoption is purely statutory
in Michigan and words of statute must prevail in this context); Vincent C. Green, Note,
Same-Sex Adoption: An Alternative Approach to Gay Marriage in New York, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 399, 416 (1996) [hereinafter Same-Sex Adoption] (discussing importance of courts'
deference to language of adoption statutes because it is purely statutory creation).
108 See Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that because
adoption process is conditioned upon numerous variables, there is no fundamental right
to adopt); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987) (noting rights to
adopt and be foster parents are not fundamental); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W. 678,
685 (Wis. 1994) (finding that because adoption is not fundamental right, having child's
best interest as paramount consideration is "neither fundamental nor protected by our
society"). See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (noting that Court
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issue of whether homosexual couples may adopt. 109
1. "Best Interests of the Child" Standard
Courts adhere to the best interests of the child standard, the
fundamental purpose of all adoption statutes, when evaluating
prospective adoptive parents. 110 The Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act 111 defines the best interests of the child and instructs
courts to consider the conduct of the proposed guardian only as it
effects his or her relation to the child.112
Despite this legal standard, judicial preferences illustrate that
the subjective nature of the best interests test allows courts to
knowingly or subconsciously mingle personal prejudices, fears,
is unwilling to take expansive view of fundamental rights).
109 See In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 862 (D.C. 1995) (concluding that appli-
cable statute allows for unmarried couples, whether same sex or opposite sex, to adopt);
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (finding that in interpreting best inter-
est of child standard, it was permissible to grant adoption to two unmarried cohabitants
if they met this standard); see also Mary L. Bonauto, Advising Non-Traditional Families:
A General Introduction, 40 Oct. A.B.A. J. 10, 10 (1996) (noting increased willingness in
courts to treat non-traditional families as legal family in context of adoption). See gener-
ally Joseph W. de Fucia, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting in Meretricious Relationships:
Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 200, 209 (1989)
(observing that changing attitudes regarding unmarried couples is evident in context of
increase of child custody cases going to unmarried cohabitants).
110 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney's 1996). "If satisfied that the best
interest of the adoptive child will be promoted... thereby the judge or surrogate shall
make an order approving the adoption... " Id.; see also In re Jacob, 63 N.Y.2d at 718,
660 N.E.2d 397, 399. The court stated that "in strictly construing the adoption statute,
[its] primary loyalty must be to the statute's legislative purpose-the child's best inter-
ests." Id.; Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). In deciding the
issue of custody, this court stated that the "paramount consideration [was] the welfare of
the children and all considerations, including the rights of parents, are subordinate to
the children's physical, intellectual, moral, spiritual and emotional well being." Id.; Doe
v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Va. 1981) (citing Cunningham v. Gray, 273 S.E.2d 562, 564
(1981)). In deciding whether the lesbian step-mother should have been granted the right
to adopt, the Doe court utilized the Cunningham court's statement: "While the welfare of
the child is of paramount concern in adoption cases, nonetheless the rights of a natural
parent vis-A-vis a non-parent will be maintained if at all consistent with the child's best
interests." Id.
111 UNiFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (West Ann. 1987 &
Supp. 1997).
112 Id. The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the
child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and inter-relationship of the child with
his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interest; (4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and commu-
nity; and (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. The court
shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relation-
ship to the child.
Id.
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and moral views with this standard. 113 For example, there is a
preference to place children with married couples reflecting the
belief that marriage automatically indicates stability and the
child's best interests. 114
Fortunately, a number of courts are breaking away from the
confines of stereotyping homosexuals and are granting second-
parent adoptions to homosexual couples 115 when consistent with
the best interests of the child. 116 A common barrier, however, is
113 See Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Cus-
tody After Divorce, 64 TEx. L. REV. 687, 720 (1985) (pointing out judicial approach lacking
presumptions truly allows case-by-case evaluations); Felicia Meyers, Note, Gay Custody
and Adoption: An Unequal Application of the Law, 14 WHITIER L. REV. 839, 841 (1993)
(discussing how courts have allowed "judicial misconceptions and prejudice to enter into
[best interest] analysis"); see also Jeff Atkinson, Criterion for Deciding Child Custody in
the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 3 (1984) (noting that there is lack of uni-
formity in child custody cases because judges apply their own life experiences to these
cases). See generally Steve Suseoff, Assessing Children's Best Interest When a Parent is
Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 856 (1985)
(discussing how best interest standard is useful in avoiding arbitrary decision making
but lends itself to extensive abuse).
114 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419, 1493 (1993) (responding to traditional rationales opposing same-sex marriage); see
also Russman, supra note 104, at 50 (articulating that statutory, regulatory, and judicial
barriers all help to discourage homosexual adoption); Mark Strasser, Legislative Pre-
sumptions and Judicial Assumptions: On Parenting, Adoption, and the Best Interests of
the Child, 45 KAN. L. REV. 49, 49 (1996) [hereinafter Legislative Presumptions] (noting
some courts use parents' sexual orientation to determine best interests while some legis-
latures have established unrebuttable presumptions against such parents).
115 See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 316(Mass. 1993) (noting lesbian couple
provided loving home for daughter and participated equally in parenting responsibili-
ties); In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 998-99 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1992) (recognizing that child's
best interest is not controlled by parental sexual orientation); Adoptions of B.L.V.B and
E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (asserting that to deny children of same-sex
partners security of legal relationship would not be in their best interests); Julia Frost
Davies, Note, Two Moms and a Baby: Protecting the Nontraditional Family Through
Second Parent Adoption, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1055, 1067-68 (1995) (analogizing step-
parent exception with second-parent adoption, insofar as new spouse may adopt legal
parent's child without terminating his or her rights); see also Elovitz, supra note 102, at
207 (explaining that unlike traditional adoption, where parental rights and obligations of
legal or biological parent are extinguished, second parent adoption leaves natural par-
ent's rights intact and creates second, legally recognized parent); Kovacs, supra note 100,
at 536 (asserting legalization of gay and lesbian marriage facilitates recognition of rela-
tionships between second-parents and child in same-sex family, hence, legitimizing non-
traditional families); Lucious, supra note 6, at 194 (discussing second parent adoption);
Elizabeth Zuckerman, Comment, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families:
Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729, 729-32 (1986) (defining
second parent adoption as adoption of child by natural parent's non-marital partner
wherein, unlike traditional adoption, rights and obligations of natural parent are not
terminated or cut off).
116 See In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 854 (D.C. 1995) (hypothesizing that if
children available for adoption are likely to be denied permanent, loving homes when
unmarried couples are refused opportunity to adopt, "absurdity" or "injustice" criteria
cuts against restrictive interpretation of adoption statute); see also In re Jacob, 636
N.Y.S.2d 716, 724, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995) (concluding that New York statute
was designed to protect new adoptive families and not intended to prohibit otherwise
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that same-sex couples are not afforded the right to marry and
courts are reluctant to automatically grant these adoptions be-
cause of this restriction. 117
2. Myths and Misconceptions Regarding Homosexuals
In evaluating same-sex couples as prospective adoptive par-
ents, courts often subordinate the best interests of the child and
focus, instead, on the myths and stereotypes regarding homo-
sexuality.118 One common misconception views homosexuality as
a form of mental illness. 119 This is an antiquated notion con-
firmed by the fact that the American Psychiatric Association
("APA") has removed sexual orientation from its list of mental
disorders. 120 Furthermore, in 1976 the APA adopted a resolution
beneficial intrafamily adoptions by second parents); Davies, supra note 115, at 1072-1074
(including inheritance, succession, and health insurance in discussion of familial benefits
and obligations incurred upon adoption of child). See generally In re Adoption of Caitlin,
622 N.Y.S.2d 835, 839, 163 Misc.2d 999 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1994) (asserting stepparent excep-
tion established because it was illogical to terminate biological parent's rights when par-
ent continues to raise and be responsible for child, "albeit in family unit with partner
who is biologically unrelated to child").
117 See Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent Adoption: Overcoming Barriers to Lesbian
Family Rights, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 175, 189-90 (1995) (noting statutory exception to
automatic termination of natural parent's legal rights is inapplicable to homosexual
partners because they are not legal spouses); see also In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 859
(providing purposes of D.C. stepparent exception provision).
118 See S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985) (overturning trial court
ruling denying lesbian mother custody since it "relied on its own unsupported opinion
that homosexual relationships are unstable and usually of short duration"); Nancy E.
Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 19 (1995) (noting em-
phasis placed on concept of nuclear family permeates legal decisions); Gwynne L. Skin-
ner, Intimate Association and the First Amendment, 3 LAW & SEX. 1, 14 (1993) (proposing
that rights of intimate expression should become part of this analysis and extend beyond
traditional family); see also Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Rede-
fining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontradi-
tional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 545 (1990) (criticizing tendency of courts and legisla-
ture to rely on "discriminatory ideologies disguised as scientific truth to serve as basis for
judicial and statutory activism in area of child rearing"); Russman, supra note 104, at 58
(analyzing myths regarding homosexual parenting).
119 See Stephen B. Pershing, "Entreat Me Not to Leave Thee" Bottoms v. Bottoms
and the Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 289, 299
(1994). Even religious organizations are changing their view on homosexuality as a men-
tal illness as evidenced by an amicus brief filed on behalf of Hardwick to eliminate sod-
omy laws. Id.; Annamay T. Sheppard, Lesbian Mothers II: Long Night's Journey into
Day, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 185, 188 (1992). The author discusses mental illness and
its relation to homosexuality. Id.; Donald H. Stone, The Moral Dilemma: Child Custody
When One Parent is Homosexual or Lesbian - An Empirical Study, 23 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 711, 739 (1989). Despite actions by highly respected medical associations removing
homosexuality from the list of mental illnesses, courts in child custody cases are slow to
utilize these findings. Id.
120 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, D.S.M III: DIAGNOSTIC AND STA-
TISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 281-82, 380 (3d ed. rev. 1980) (noting homo-
sexuality "implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability or general social or
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stating that sexual orientation should not be the sole or primary
consideration in custody cases.
121
Another common misconception is that children placed with
same-sex couples are subject to an increased risk of contracting
the HIV virus because of the high percentage of HIV infected
individuals in the homosexual community. 122 This myth, how-
ever, is dispelled since it is commonly understood that the virus
cannot be contracted through casual contact. 123 It is contracted
primarily through unprotected sex and the sharing of hypoder-
mic needles. 124 In addition, AIDS is not limited to the homosex-
vocational activities").
121 See William E. Adams, Whose Family is it Anyway? The Continuing Struggle for
Lesbian and Gay Men Seeking to Adopt Children, 30 NEW ENG. L.REV. 579, 598 (1996)
(analyzing different professional organizations, including American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, which removed homosexuality from list of mental illnesses for purposes of child cus-
tody cases); John J. Conger, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, In-
corporated, for the Year 1976, 32 AM. PSYCHOL. 408, 432 (1977) (quoting A.P.A.'s
resolution that: "[Tihe sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation of natural or prospec-
tive adoptive or foster parents should not be the sole or primary variable considered in
custody or placement cases"); Elovitz, supra note 102, at 216 (noting that many other sci-
entific bodies have acted to rebut myths about homosexuals in this context); see also
Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyers Guide to Social Science
Research, 1 LAW & SEX. 133, 138-43 (1991) (reviewing development of social science re-
search in this field).
122 See Evall, supra note 101, at 357-58. Often the HIV status of a homosexual
seeking to adopt is discarded and the perceived likelihood is given greater weight. Id.;
Amy D. Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms: The Lesbian Mother and The Judicial Perpetuation
of Damaging Stereotypes, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 341, 345 (1995). Courts have also
branded a homosexual parent as one who will infect the child with AIDS. Id.; David S.
Dooley, Comment, Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad Because They're Wrong: Sexual
Orientation and Presumptions of Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes, 26 CAL. W. L.
REV. 395, 422 (1989/1990). Often the potential for children to be infected with HIV is
used in an attempt to deny custody in many disputes, however it has enjoyed limited suc-
cess. Id.; see also In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 891 (Ohio 1990) (Resnick,
J., dissenting). Judge Resnick believed the risk of HIV in the homosexual community is
too high to be in the best interest of the child. Id. He thought that since AIDS is terminal
and adoption was permanent, the risk of the child being left parentless again warranted
refusing homosexual people permission to adopt. Id.
123 See Gerald H. Friedland et al., Lack of Transmission of HTLV-III/LAV Infection
to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex With Oral Can-
didiasis, 314 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 344, 348 (1986) (concluding that AIDS is transmitted
exclusively by injection of infected blood or blood products, or by intimate sexual contact
with infected individual, and not by casual contact); see also Bless S. Young & Kimberly
R. Wells, Managing AIDS in the Workplace, 41 No.3 PRAC. LAW. 41, 43 (1995) (noting all
scientific studies to date indicate that casual contact does not spread AIDS).
124 See L. FRUMKIN & J. LEONARD, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON AIDS 32-52 (1987)
(asserting that AIDS is transmitted through bodily fluids; sexual contact, intravenous
injection of drugs with unsterilized needles, blood transfusions or in utero from mother to
child); David M. Rosenblum, Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 36 VILL. L.
REV. 1665, 1682-83 (1991) (indicating that although AIDS virus cannot be spread by cas-
ual contact, courts often rely on myth that all gay people are equally likely to carry AIDS
virus).
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ual population. 125 It logically follows, therefore, that homosexu-
als should not be precluded from adopting due to the fear of HIV
transmission. 1 26
Often, criticism of same-sex couple adoption has focused on the
immorality of their lifestyle. 127 The stigma of immorality has at-
tached to homosexuality, in large part, due to the decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick,128 upholding Georgia's criminalization of
homosexual conduct. 129 Homosexual sodomy has been criminal-
ized in almost half of this nation's jurisdictions. 130 Even in ju-
risdictions that prohibit homosexual conduct, however, few cases
have actually been prosecuted, illustrating the ambiguous nature
125 See Judith A. Lintz, The Opportunities, of Lack Thereof, for Homosexual Adults to
Adopt Children, 16 U. DAYTON L.REV. 471, 493 (1991) (indicating "AIDS is [ sexually
transmitted illness that does not discriminate on basis of sexual orientation").
126 See Josephine Gittler & Merle McPherson, Symposium: HIV Infection Among
Women of Reproductive Age, Children, and Adolescents, Introduction, 77 IOWA L. REV.
1283, 1287 (1992). HIV is largely transmitted through heterosexual intercourse. Id.; Rev.
Raymond C. O'Brien, An Argument for the Inclusion of Children Without Medicare, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 567, 608-09 (1995). HIV is spreading more rapidly in the hetero-
sexual population. Id.
127 See Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 764 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (reasoning that
mother's display of affection towards female partner in presence of child was harmful and
therefore valid basis for altering custody rights); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 107
(Va. 1995) (discussing harmful effects of child's exposure to immoral behavior of same-sex
couples behavior); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 691 (Va. 1985) (holding best interests of
child were jeopardized if court granted custody to parent who "carr[ied] on active homo-
sexual relationship in the same residence as the child"); see also Mark Strasser, Fit to Be
Tied: On Custody, Discretion, and Sexual Orientation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 859 (1997)
(analogizing that to uphold public perception of immorality of same-sex relations war-
rants outdated opinion that interracial relationships are also immoral).
128 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
129 Id. See Murray L. Manus, The Proposed Model Surrogate Parenthood Act: A Leg-
islative Response to the Challenges to Reproductive Technology, 29 MICH. J.L. REF. 671,
703 (1995) (noting it would be difficult for Supreme Court to be supportive of homosexual
desire to have or adopt children in light of Bowers); Russman, supra note 104, at 51-52
(stating some courts deny homosexuals adoption privileges because homosexual acts are
criminal in their jurisdiction); see also John C. Hayes, Note, The Tradition of Prejudice
Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny
After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. REV. 375, 376 (1990) (noting result in Bowers is
that there will be increased force for state sponsored discrimination against homosexu-
als).
130 See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 5-14-122 (1995); FLA.
STAT. § 800.02 (1997); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1996);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.89 (West 1997);
MD. ANN. CODE Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 34 (1996); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.158 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1997); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-29-59 (1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-405
(1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.190 (Michie 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1995);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1994); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1996); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1997); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-361 (Michie 1996).
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of public sentiment on homosexual conduct. 131 Moreover, al-
though homosexuality is not the "social norm," it must also be
noted that, historically, social norms such as segregation and re-
ligious condemnation have often enveloped immorality. 132
A common fear is that children raised in same-sex households
may question their own sexual preference. 133 Research, however,
indicates that children raised by homosexual mothers and fa-
thers do not display an increased likelihood of becoming gay or
lesbian.134 Further, it is also well documented that there are no
significant differences in the psychological health of children
raised by lesbian or gay parents, as compared with children
raised by heterosexual parents. 135 There also is little evidence to
131 See Terry S. Kogan, Legislative Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 209, 227. Even if sodomy statutes are not enforced, they still loom as part
of a larger oppression against lesbians and gay men. Id.; see also Janet E. Halley, Rea-
soning About Sodomy: Act and Identify In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV.
1721, 1722 (1993). Sodomy statutes continue to exist to identify and subordinate homo-
sexuals. Id.; Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual
Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 263, 284-85 (1992).
These statutes are the reinforcing principle behind forbidden same-sex marriage. Id.
132 See Polikoff, supra note 118, at 549-54 (analyzing myth equating homosexuality
and immorality); see, e.g., Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous
Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 84-85 (utilizing Nazi Germany as example of er-
roneous presumption that simply because majority agrees that something is good does
not necessarily mean that it is, since some social norms are themselves immoral).
133 See Shaista Parveen Ali, Comment, Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and
Adoption, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.REV. 1009, 1013 (1989) (noting that many courts assume
same-sex couples will turn their children into homosexuals); Tiffani G. Lee, Note, Cox v.
Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services: A Challenge to Florida's Homosexual Adop-
tion Ban, 51 U. MIAMI L.REV. 151, 155 (1996) (asserting that judicial preconceptions re-
garding same-sex parents includes fear that child will become homosexual). But see Bar-
bara A. Robb, Note, The Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in the Wake of
Romer v. Evans, 32 NEW ENG. L.REV. 263, 321 (1997) (indicating that studies reveal that
there is no evidence of significant disturbances in development of sexual identity among
children of same-sex parents).
134 See Elovitz, supra note 102, at 213 (dispelling myth that sexuality of children is
affected by sexuality of parent); Flaks, supra note 55, at 369-70 (citing various scientific
studies supporting conclusion that parental sexuality is not determinative factor in de-
velopment of homosexuality in children); Homosexual Parents: All in the Family, Emo-
tional Development of Children of Homosexual Parents, SCI. NEWS, Jan. 21, 1995, at 42,
available in 1995 WL 122553461 (referring to three studies in January Developmental
Psychology that show large majority of sons of homosexual men are themselves hetero-
sexual); see also Scientists Find New Evidence of Homosexuality Gene in Men, CHICAGO
TRIB., Oct. 30, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 6260810 (reaffirming 1993 headlines that
scientific evidence supports theory that gene inherited from mother influences son's
sexuality).
135 See Martha Ertman, Denying the Secret of Joy: A Critique of Posner's Theory of
Sexuality, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1512 (1993) (doubting whether homosexual partners
impair child's psychological health); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Custody/ Visitation Issues in
LEGAL ISSUES FACING THE NON-TRADITIONAL FAMILY, at 299, 342 (PLI TAX L. & EST.
PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 232, 1994) (discussing studies showing lesbian
mothers differ little from heterosexual parents); Anne B. Goldstein, Reasoning About
Homosexuality: A Commentary on Janet Halley's "Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and
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support the notion that homosexual parents are more prone to
sexually abuse their children or to allow others to molest their
children.136 Statistics consistently illustrate that the vast major-
ity of incest cases involve heterosexual fathers and their daugh-
ters, and that in general, sex offenders are predominantly het-
erosexual men. 137
3. Same-Sex Marriages are in the Best Interests of the
Children of Same-Sex Parents
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a link be-
tween marriage and parental rights in numerous custody
Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1800 (1993) (noting New
Hampshire legislature received no meaningful evidence that homosexual parents endan-
ger their children's psychological health when enacting statute prohibiting same-sex
adoptions); Deborah M. Henson, A Lesbian Feminist Critique of Susan Okin's Justice,
Gender, and the Family: Lesbian Development of Morality and Justice, 4 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 249, 260-61 (1993) (stating studies reveal children born to or adopted by
lesbian mothers have greater sense of well-being than children of heterosexual couples);
Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children By Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social
Science Prospective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L.& POL'Y 191, 204 (1995) (asserting children of
lesbian mothers feel most wanted because of difficulty of adopting that child); David M.
Rosenblum, Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1665, 1676
(1991) (asserting there is lack of research concluding that homosexual parents affects
child's development); see also Richard Green et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children:
A Comparison with Solo Parent Heterosexual Mothers and Their Children, 15 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 179, 184 (1986) (examining scientific studies concerning children of
lesbian mothers).
136 See Shaista-Parveen All, Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and Adoption, 22
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1989) (outlining judicial and social preconceptions over
homosexual parents, including fear of child molestation); Katja M. Eichinger-Swainston,
Fox v. Fox: Redefining the Best Interest of the Child Standard for Lesbian Mothers and
Their Families, 32 TULSA L.J. 57, 71 (1996) (discussing myth that homosexual parents
are more likely to molest children than heterosexuals); Carol Jenny et al., Are Children
at Risk for Sexual Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94 PEDIATRICS 41, 44 (1994) (finding child is
100 times more likely to be sexually abused by heterosexual partner of relative than by
gay adult); DARYL R. WISHARD, OUT OF THE CLOSET AND INTO THE COURTS: HOMOSEXUAL
FATHERS AND CHILD CUSTODY 93, 401, 410 (1989) (discounting myth that homosexual fa-
thers are more likely to molest their children).
137 See John C. Hayes, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality:
Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31
B.C. L. REV. 375, 397-98 (1990) (noting homosexual males are less prone to molest chil-
dren than heterosexual males); Devjani Mishra, The Road to Concord: Resolving the Con-
flict of Law Over Adoption by Gays and Lesbians, 30 COLUM J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 96
n.23 (1996) (indicating that 97% of sex offenses against children are committed by het-
erosexual men); William B. Rubenstein, Legal Issues Facing the Non-Traditional Family
in LEGAL ISSUES FACING THE NON-TRADITIONAL FAMILY, at 9, 36 (PLI TAX L. & EST.
PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 232m 1994) (stating that most perpetrators of
child sex offenses are heterosexual men and most victims are girls); Steve Suseoff, As-
sessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent Is Gay or Lesbian: Towards Rational
Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 880-81 (1985) (discussing research showing
disproportionately high number of heterosexual child sex offenders as compared to homo-
sexuals).
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cases. 138 When same-sex parents are denied the right to marry,
they are also denied the benefits normally associated with mar-
riage, such as family privileges. 139 The state's alleged interest in
regulating marriage is rooted in fostering procreation and estab-
lishing family stability.140 It should follow that the sex of the
parents should not interfere with the child's ability to receive the
numerous legal and emotional benefits enjoyed by a child of a
married couple. 14 1
Absent marital status, many same-sex partners are denied
benefits under the laws of intestacy, 142 divorce,143 tax,144 insur-
138 See Lehr v. Robertons, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) (upholding child's adoption by
stepfather over objections of biological father); Kovacs, supra note 100, at 534 (discussing
Supreme Court cases emphasizing link between marriage and parental rights); see also
Santovsky II v. Krammer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (refusing to assume separated par-
ents are adversaries when considering best interests of child in granting custody); Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (considering effect of non-marriage of parents on
parental rights); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972) (holding Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses afforded unwed father right to hearing on fitness as parent,
focusing on his significant interest in his children).
139 See Leonard, supra note 88, at 942 (contending that giving same-sex couples
benefits assists children in similar fashion as for children of opposite-sex couples); Lu-
cious, supra note 6, at 179 (addressing same-sex couples' denial of family privileges
which opposite-sex couples receive upon marriage); Wilson, supra note 23, at 543
(arguing that denial of same-sex marriage licenses actually deters state interest in pro-
moting family stability).
140 See Christine Jax, Same-Sex Marriage-Why Not?, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 461, 463
(1995) (illustrating states' interest in regulation of marriage derived from values regard-
ing "procreation, family stability, safeguarding societal mores, and preserving personal
morals"); see also Antimiscengenation Analogy, supra note 24, at 1012 (indicating judicial
perspective of underlying purpose of marriage is to provide stable setting for children and
that propagation of human race is basic to marriage and its legal attributes); see, e.g.,
Constant A. v. Paul C., 496 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1985) (describing goals of traditional fam-
ily as stable family relationship and procreation). See generally Same-Sex Couples and
the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1603, 1608-10 (1989) (setting forth state justifications for
prohibiting same-sex marriages); Wilson, supra note 23, at 544 (1991) (discussing state
interest in promoting traditional family unit).
141 See Sue N. Averill, Desperately Seeking Status: Same-Sex Couples Battle for Em-
ployment Linked Benefits, 27 AKRON L. REV. 253, 280 (1993) (addressing issue of denial of
employment benefits to same-sex couples); Same-Sex Adoption, supra note 107, at 425
(addressing issue of denial of health insurance benefits to children of same-sex couples);
Christine Jax, Same-Sex Marriage-Why Not?, 4 WIDENER J.PuB.L. 461, 463 (1995)
(associating social acceptance, public recognition and legal and financial benefits with
recognized marriage); Kovacs, supra note 100, at 533 (explaining legalization of gay and
lesbian marriage would provide children with predictability and stability of existing stat-
utes and case law with respect to custody, visitation, and support of children).
142 See In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1990) (holding
surviving gay partner did not have right to elect against partner's will), aff'd, 187 A.D.2d
128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (2d Dept. 1993); see also Dena L. Narbaitz, Minimizing the
Trauma: A Need for Change in State Conservatorship Laws as Applied to Same-Sex Life
Partners, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 803, 825 (1993) (discussing denial of spousal preference to
same-sex partners in state conservatorship laws).
143 See Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE
L. REV. 311, 325 (1980) (noting that there were no statutes or legal procedures that en-
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ance, 145 and employer-related benefits. 146 For example, although
traditional adoption was originally created in order to provide an
heir for the adoptive parent, 147 children of same-sex couples are
often denied inheritance rights.148 Family status is also defined
by marriage, in many cases, so that same-sex parents and their
children are denied family member status149 with respect to
medical emergency, incompetence and guardianship.150
sured fair treatment of same-sex partners upon separation).
144 See generally Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U. L.
REV. 359, 359-65 (1995) (delving into practical and economic issues, including tax ramifi-
cations, of "marital package," not available to same-sex couples).
145 See Chase, supra note 144, at 363-64 (pointing out denial of federal programs to
same-sex couples, such as social security, veterans' benefits and disability insurance);
Treuthart, supra note 29, at 92 (noting that legally married couples are entitled to recov-
ery for loss of consortium, financial support upon separation, and lower insurance premi-
ums).
146 See Same-Sex Adoption, supra note 107, at 427 (outlining various benefits that
arise from marriage); see also In re Rovira v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp. 1062, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding surviving same-sex partner and her children were not entitled to death
benefits under AT&T pension plan). See generally Averill, supra note 141, at 280
(addressing denial of employment benefits to unmarried couples' partners).
147 See William F. Fratcher, Class Gifts to "Heirs," "Issue," and Like Groups, 55 ALB.
L. REV. 1205, 1225 (1992) (observing that while many questions were left unanswered by
early adoption statutes, there was no question that adopted children could take from
adoptive parents through intestate succession); see also Russman, supra note 104, at 48(noting historical purpose of adoption was to provide heir for adoptive parent); William
H. Wood, Jr. et al., Treatment of Adopted Individuals Under Laws of Descent and Distri-
bution in Connecticut, 9 CONN. PROB. L.J. 211, 212-13 (1995) (noting first adoption stat-
ute in Connecticut provided inheritance rights between adoptive parents and children
and cut off inheritance rights between natural parents and child).
148 See Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family,
1996 UTAH L.REV. 93, 149 (1996) (pointing out corollary between establishing new, par-
ent-child relationship with adoption and automatic inclusion as heir); see also Ralph C.
Brashier, Protecting the Child From Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA.
L. REV. 1, 26 (1996) [hereinafter Protecting the Child] (noting disinheritance of children
of non-traditional families undermines best interests of those children). See generally Et-
tlebrick, supra note 57, at 126-30 (including survivor's and inheritance rights among
those rights denied to lesbian and gay families).
149 See Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and
Social Analysis of Domestic Partner Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1174-75 (1992)
(addressing non-traditional families' struggle for protection under traditional family
laws); Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of Unmarried People in American
Law, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 207, 217 (1988) (discussing role of marriage in assessing whether
parents are good or bad); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L.
REV. 1443, 1456 (arguing for less legal definitions of marriage and for more familial
definition); Zimmer, supra note 8, at 681 (discussing inter-relationship of marriage,
families, and legitimate societal status); Same-Sex Adoption, supra note 135, at 424-26
(discussing "financial well-being approach" and discrimination of same-sex partners in
both public and private sector because of unmarried status).
150 See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family
Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 126-30 (1996) (enumerating several economic and legal
benefits non-traditional families are denied, such as: Healthcare; paid bereavement
leave; parenting leave; sick leave; discounts or tuition waivers; death benefits; family
memberships; discounted family travel; home insurance coverage; tax breaks; social se-
curity benefits; survivor's and inheritance rights; family court services for domestic vio-
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Consequently, the children of parents not legally recognized as
"married" or as "spouses," are at a financial disadvantage due to
the unavailability of many legal rights and remedies. 151 Same-
sex parents and their children deserve the financial and societal
benefits that are linked with the right to marry. 152 The denial of
this right undermines the policy of promoting the best interests
of the children. 153
The definition of family has evolved to reflect the realities of
modern life. 154 The concept of the family has been expanded to
incorporate same-sex couples, thus, the legal definition of mar-
riage should mirror this reality, as well.155 As Justice Blackmun
lence; standing for wrongful death action; guardianship preference; medical decisionmak-
ing; and preferential treatment for immigration); Same-Sex Adoption, supra note 107, at
413 (asserting same-sex partners may confront problems when making decisions for one
another in cases of medical emergency or incompetence); see also Mary F. Gardner, Bra-
schi v. Stahl Associates, Co.: Much Ado About Nothing?, 35 VILL. L. REV. 361, 365 (1990)
(noting requirement that only next-of-kin may make emergency medical decisions); Neal
F. Spline, The Incompetent Individual's Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treat-
ment: Legislating, Not Litigating, A Profoundly Private Decision, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
905, 933-34 (1993) (arguing incompetent patient's interests are best protected by surro-
gates who are family members).
151 See Davies, supra note 115, at 1072-74 (asserting child of same-sex couple is
treated as "biological stranger" and denied acknowledgment of family ties and legal
rights which flow from recognition of parent/child relationship). See, e.g., In re Jacob, 636
N.Y.S.2d 716, 719-720, 660 N.E.2d 397, 400-01 (N.Y. 1995) (noting child would receive
many advantages under more liberal adoption arrangement).
152 See Toulon, supra note 11, at 131-32 (noting marriage offers society benefits and
protections); Treuthart, supra note 29, at 92 (discussing various legal and economic
benefits of marriage); Same-Sex Adoption, supra note 107, at 426-27 (addressing societal
benefits to children of marriages); see also Polikoff, supra note 118, at 561 (concluding
children of same-sex couples need recognition of their non-traditional families so legal
rules can reflect "reality of their lives"). See generally Jeffrey G. Gibson, To Love, Honor,
and Build a Life: A Case for Same-Gender Marriage, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 22, 22 (1996)
(addressing financial benefits of marriage).
153 See Right to Privacy, supra note 93, at 179 (providing that "[i]f states licensed
same-sex marriage, the courts could use precedents from marriage and family law to de-
termine the legal rights of members of same-sex families"); Mishra, supra note 137, at
102 (stating best interests of child is analyzed on case-by-case basis); Legislative Pre-
sumptions, supra note 114, at 66-67 (arguing maintenance of parent-child relationship in
best interests of child); see also Polikoff, supra note 118, at (suggesting judicial attitudes
failing to recognize integrity of two lesbian families deserves best interest of children).
See generally Protecting the Child, supra note 148, at 26 (noting state must protect
child's best interests by preventing disinheritance).
154 See Toulon, supra note 11, at 132 (stating that as definition of family continues to
change, definition of marriage must also evolve); see also Zambrowicz, supra note 11, at
929 (noting some courts and legislatures acknowledge reality that families are not al-
ways in traditional form).
155 See N.Y. RENT STAB. CODE § 2520.6(o) (McKinney 1996) (setting out "family" un-
der statute as including among other things, long term relationship not evidenced
through marriage); Braschi v. Stahl, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788-89, 543 N.E.2d 49, 52-54
(N.Y. 1989) (finding that lifetime partners are family in context of real property laws in
New York); East 10th Street Assoc. v. Estate of Goldstein, 552 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (App.
Div. 1990) (relying on precedent set by New York Court of Appeals in Braschi that same-
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once said, "we protect [the] family because it contributes so pow-
erfully to the happiness of individuals, not because of a prefer-
ence of stereotypical households." 156
CONCLUSION
The right to marry and raise a family is firmly protected by
the Constitution, and has been historically recognized as the
bedrock of society. Regardless of whether an individual chooses
to legitimize his or her relationship through the legal institution
of marriage, the fundamental right to marry should not be con-
tingent upon sexual orientation. Same-sex marriages should be
afforded the same recognition as heterosexual marriages because
they promote the same family values, including emotional sup-
port, companionship and economic stability.
Recent developments illustrate an increased willingness to af-
ford same-sex couples adoption rights, historically reserved for
heterosexual, married couples. Courts consistently assert that
the goal of adoption is to strengthen the family as a social unit
and to promote the best interests of the child. However, denial
of same-sex couples' right to marry overlooks this public policy.
The use of the best interest standard may be the public policy
force necessary to lift the prohibition on same-sex marriages. If
same-sex couples are granted the right to adopt children and to
establish family units, it seems only logical to permit them to
legitimize this unit through valid, legal marriage. Traditions
sex couples should be considered family in this context); see also Zambrowicz, supra note
11, at 929 (noting inconsistency in recognizing same-sex couples in context of real prop-
erty law while failing to provide recognition in other contexts); Zimmer, supra note 8, at
698 (noting right to privacy, family autonomy, and right to marry support right to same-
sex marriage). See generally Thomas F. Coleman, The Hawaii Legislature Has Compel-
ling Reasons to Adopt a Comprehensive Domestic Partnership Act, 5 LAW & SEX. 541, 551
(1995) (noting that support for more inclusive definitions of family is forcing legislatures
to act accordingly).
156 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Anne M. Burton, Gay Marriage - A Modern Proposal: Applying Baehr v. Lewin To The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Lights, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL STUD. 177, 178
(1995) (discussing importance of family unit for both heterosexual and same-sex couples);
D'Amato, supra note 28, at 940 (discussing Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick
and arguing for recognition of same-sex marriages); Amy D. Rosner, Amathia and Denial
of "In the Home" in Bowers v. Hardwick and Shahar v. Bowers: Objective Correlatives
and the Bacchae as Tools for Analyzing Privacy and Intimacy, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 263,
285 (1996) (discussing various dissents offered in Bowers v. Hardwick); David M. Smolin,
The Jurisprudence of Privacy In a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 975, 982
(1992) (stating that families and other nontraditional forms of associations promote
"personal development and continual self-definition" of individual).
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and customs are amenable to societal changes and courts must
apply the law to reflect these developments in order for society to
grow and function on a just level for all.
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